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Power-imbalanced relationships in the dyadic food chain: An 
empirical investigation of retailers’ commercial practices with 
suppliers 
Abstract 
Multiple retailers exercise various commercial practices with their suppliers. These 
practices emanate from a power-imbalanced dyadic relationship largely governed by 
the heightened retail power. These power-imbalanced, supplier-retailer relationships 
are the focus of this study. Drawing on the current literature of power-imbalanced 
relationships in supply chains, we propose and explore a conceptual model illustrating 
the most significant practices applied in the dyadic, supplier-retailer relationships in 
the Greek food chain and we evaluate their importance as perceived by suppliers. 
Insights from qualitative in-depth interviews with various stakeholders and a survey 
with 398 food suppliers identify dependence, financial goal incompatibility, 
informational asymmetry and behavioural uncertainty as the most significant 
determinants of the commercial practices. These practices are grouped in three main 
categories: upfront payments, unanticipated changes of agreements and negotiation 
pressures. The importance of these practices for suppliers is highlighted and 
implications for the supply chain actors beyond the dyad are provided. Significant 
managerial and policy implications are reported.  
Keywords: power-imbalanced relationships, dyad, food supply chain, commercial 
practices.  
 
1. Introduction 
Power is a significant concept for understanding contemporary supplier-retailer 
relationships (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007). It is the ability of a party to influence its 
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partner’s decision making (Gaski, 1984) and, in a dyadic relationship, it is based on 
partner’s dependence on the other party (Ryu et al., 2008).  
The role and significance of power has been stressed by many authors in relation to 
supply chain relationships (e.g. Hoejmose et al., 2013; Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007; 
Benton & Maloni, 2005). Here, differences in dependence, size or expertise in these 
relationships frequently create asymmetry between chain members (Kumar, 2005; 
Nyaga et al., 2013) enabling the most powerful party to gain a higher proportion of 
benefits (Hoejmose et al., 2013). Due to this asymmetrical distribution of rewards, 
power imbalance is frequently described as a negative aspect of supply chain 
relationships and is seen as a source of conflict (Hingley, 2005a). However, this 
negative view of power is not universally adopted. Power in supply chain 
relationships may be used as a means to effective coordination, integration and goal 
attainment (Belaya & Hanf, 2009) where weaker chain members may be willing to 
tolerate imbalanced relationships as long as their gains are reasonable (Hingley, 
2005a). Therefore, when we examine imbalanced relationships, any disproportional 
share of benefits does not necessarily result in unstable relationships (Belaya & Hanf, 
2009; Hingley, 2005a).   
Additionally, many authors have observed a shift in the balance of power from food 
suppliers to multiple food retailers across the world (Fernie, 2014a; Fearne et al., 
2005; Hingley, 2005b). The term “multiple retailers” refers to retailing organizations 
with a portfolio of at least ten stores (Pioch & Byrom, 2004)
1
. The latter shift of 
power (in retailers’ favor) is attributed to the high retail market concentration, the 
increased scale of retail supply chain operations, the possession of unique information 
concerning consumers’ purchases and supply chain product movement and the 
                                                             
1 For the rest of the paper the term “retailers” will refer to multiple retailers. 
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significant market share of own brands (Hingley, 2005b). Due to this power shift, 
small and medium-sized suppliers could be disadvantaged when they deal with 
retailers (Blundel & Hingley, 2001). 
The power-imbalanced nature of that dyadic relationship results in retailers imposing 
their rules during commercial exchanges with suppliers by using various commercial 
practices and, subsequently, retailers gain a disproportionate share of commercial 
benefits (Duffy et al., 2003). The commercial practices followed may take various 
forms including suppliers’ operational modifications according to retailer’s needs, 
financial pressures and margin contributions initiated by retailers, risk shifting and 
cost shifting in favour of retailers and making changes by retailers to contractual 
agreements without adequate notice (Hoejmose et al., 2013; Hingley, 2005a; Towill, 
2005; Duffy et al., 2003). The work by Fearne et al. (2005), Fearne et al. (2004) and 
Duffy et al. (2003) empirically confirmed the occurrence of these practices in food 
supply chain relationships; Moberg & Speh (2003) also confirmed their occurrence in 
supplier-retailer dyads (including food chain dyads). According to these studies, these 
practices have a negative notion and threaten the stability of the relationships. An 
alternative view could be that suppliers comply with the use of these practices by 
retailers as part of their market oriented behavior where they aim to create and 
maintain favorable relationships with retailers (Chung et al., 2011). In addition, these 
practices may improve supply chain efficiency due to an efficient cost sharing and 
risk shifting between suppliers and retailers and they may increase supply chain 
competitiveness by reducing retailers’ prices (Bloom et al., 2000). Rao & Mahi (2003) 
confirm the link between these practices and power by highlighting that suppliers 
commanding a strong market share are asked by retailers to make smaller upfront 
financial contributions to them than suppliers commanding a weak market share.   
4 
 
Despite the above work, no past study has developed a model and tested these 
practices from the perspective of power. This is surprising since these practices can be 
regarded as the application of retailers’ power in their stable, but largely imbalanced 
relationships with suppliers. Aiming to address this gap in the literature, we develop a 
conceptual model that describes the application of retail power as manifested in 
specific commercial practices. Therefore, the key objective of this study which 
empirically focuses on the dyadic food supply chain is to explore how power is 
manifested through these commercial practices and to illustrate how this power is 
perceived by suppliers. We need to stress that it is beyond the scope of this study to 
illustrate whether these practices are fair / unfair or positive / negative.  
The above issue has also attracted the interest of relevant government and regulatory 
bodies which ordered investigations on supplier-retailer relationships in the food 
supply chain (e.g. Comisión Nacional de la Competencia, 2011; European 
Commission, 2013; UK Competition Commission, 2008). Some of their reports were 
based on large scale surveys and confirmed the occurrence of these practices and their 
prevalence in various European markets. No specific statutory abuses concerning the 
examined dyad have been discovered although concerns about the long term impact of 
these practices on the supply chain have been raised (European Commission, 2013; 
Comisión Nacional de la Competencia, 2011; UK Competition Commission, 2008). 
Since these practices are an example of exercise of retailer power towards suppliers, 
they can be evaluated by illustrating how these practices are perceived by suppliers. 
The latter represents another aim of our study which focuses on the Greek food supply 
chain considering the scarcity of relevant academic work that examines retailers’ 
commercial practices with suppliers. Overall, the study aims to answer the following 
research questions: 
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 Which are the most significant determinants of retailers’ application of power 
in their relationship with suppliers of the Greek food supply chain? 
 Which are the most significant commercial practices that reflect retailers’ 
application of power towards suppliers in the Greek food supply chain? 
 What is the importance of these practices based on suppliers’ perceptions? 
 
The paper is set out as follows: the next section introduces a conceptual model that 
describes the manifestation of these practices in food supply chain relationships and 
presents the relevant hypotheses that emerge. The methodology employed is then 
analyzed and the key results are presented. A discussion of the results follows and the 
paper concludes with the provision of managerial and policy implications.  
 
2. Conceptual model and hypotheses development 
A conceptual model is developed focusing on the power-imbalanced supply chain 
relationship literature incorporating retailers’ commercial practices as manifestations 
of retailers’ exercised power with suppliers (see Figure 1). Four significant 
determinants are identified in the literature including suppliers’ dependence on 
retailers, goal incompatibility between suppliers and retailers, informational 
asymmetry between the two parties and behavioral uncertainty of retailers in 
determining this manifestation of retail power. According to the literature, these 
determinants influence the application of retailers’ power allowing them to extract 
higher gains from their relationship partners (see Hoejmose et al., 2013; Crosno & 
Dahlstrom, 2008; Hingley et al., 2006; Dobson, 2005; Duffy et al., 2003; Batt 2003; 
Simatupang & Sridharan, 2002). The relevant hypotheses are provided in the 
following pages. 
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    “Insert Figure 1 here” 
 
2.1 Dependence and retailers’ commercial practices 
Dependence between two firms exists when the benefits derived from their 
relationship are not available outside of it (Ryu et al., 2008). The concept of 
dependence can be employed to explain power in business relationships as the power 
of B over A is based upon the dependence of A on B (Emerson, 1962). In power-
imbalanced relationships, the weaker firm is highly dependent on a more powerful 
firm and, therefore, the weaker firm needs to maintain the relationship to achieve its 
goals (Ryu et al., 2008). Zhuang et al. (2010) argue that inter-firm dependence may 
affect the exercise of power. According to Caniëls & Gelderman (2007) a firm which 
experiences high power due to its partners being highly dependent on it, may exploit 
its power to increase its gains. However, in the long term, the excessive exploitation 
of the dependent party may damage the relationship (Hoejmose et al., 2013; Caniëls & 
Gelderman, 2007) and some firms develop guidelines to limit the amount of output 
they purchase from suppliers in order to reduce these suppliers’ dependence (Krause 
et al., 2007).   
In addition, the results of dependency may extend beyond the dyad. For example, a 
supplier (Tier 1 supplier in this chain) which is being eroded excessively due to a high 
dependency on a retailer, may attempt to offset these losses by achieving better 
trading terms with its suppliers (Tier 2 suppliers in this chain, see Fearne et al., 2005). 
In the food supply chain, suppliers depend on fewer retailers in order to sell their 
products (Fernie, 2014a) as these retailers represent the main gateway to consumers. 
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Suppliers are faced with a high cost if they lose business with a major retailer as these 
retailers may represent a key account for the supplier and generate a large share of 
supplier’s total sales (Dobson, 2005). We acknowledge that there are cases where 
retailers are dependent on suppliers too especially when retailers rely on suppliers’ 
resources and capabilities to achieve their objectives (e.g. category management 
capabilities, see Morgan et al., 2007). However, it is generally agreed that dependence 
and, subsequently, power has shifted from suppliers to retailers in the food supply 
chain (Fernie, 2014a; Hingley, 2005b; Burt & Sparks, 2003). Based on the previous 
points, we hypothesize that: 
Η1: There is a positive association between suppliers’ dependence on retailers and 
retailers’ use of commercial practices with suppliers. 
 
2.2 Goal incompatibility and retailers’ commercial practices 
Goal incompatibility occurs when two partners have differing goals and refers to the 
situation when the pursuit of goals from one partner hinders the pursuit of the other 
partner’s goals (Das & Rahman, 2010). It also encompasses the notion of conflict of 
interest between organizations (Das & Rahman, 2010). The relationship between 
power and goal incompatibility is highly significant in asymmetric relationships as the 
stronger party may exercise its power for pursuing its own goals at the expense of the 
other parties in a relationship (Batt, 2003). However, a power-imbalanced relationship 
may be a collaborative relationship such as the one between retailers and own brand 
manufacturers (Collins & Burt, 2003) or the one between manufacturers and suppliers 
in the automotive sector (Dyer & Hatch, 2004); in the latter relationship, the share of 
benefits between partners is predetermined by standardized processes and the goal 
conflict may not be so intense (Dyer & Hatch, 2004; Collins & Burt, 2003). Building 
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on that point, Gagalyuk et al. (2013) note that powerful firms should develop supply 
chain-wide goals that would align the interests of different supply chain members and 
would increase the compatibility between their individual goals; in this way, the 
overall supply chain relationships’ outcomes may increase.  
In addition, power-imbalanced food supply chain relationships do not necessitate 
mutually beneficial gains as partners focus on maximizing their own benefits 
(Hingley, 2005a). For example in the food supply chains, suppliers aim to maximize 
their profits by displaying their products in the retail store in the best possible way and 
at minimum expense whilst retailers aim to acquire products at minimum cost, 
increase stock turnover, maximize their profits per square foot and improve the 
positioning of their own brands (Gómez & Rubio, 2008; Dobson, 2005; Murry & 
Heide, 1998). Therefore, suppliers and retailers have different financial priorities, 
command different financial goals and, overall, the goals between partners may be 
less aligned than assumed (see Morgan et al. 2007). It is not surprising then that 
retailers may exercise their power (via employing various commercial practices) to 
put suppliers under financial pressure, fulfill their own goals and gain a higher share 
of supply chain benefits (Dobson, 2005). Based on the previous arguments, we 
hypothesize that: 
Η2: There is a positive association between suppliers’ and retailers’ financial goal 
incompatibility and retailers’ use of commercial practices with suppliers. 
 
2.3 Informational asymmetry and retailers’ commercial practices 
Informational asymmetry takes place when information concerning a relationship is 
only available to one trading partner and the remaining parties do not possess the 
same level of information (Li & Zhang, 2008). This information could be used by the 
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more powerful partner to achieve better business terms from weaker partners (Belaya 
& Hanf, 2009). Under a similar fashion, in supply chains, the member who has more 
information may be able to extract a higher share of gains (Simatupang & Sridharan, 
2002). Over the last two decades, retailers have increased their capabilities in terms of 
collecting information (Burt & Sparks, 2003). Retailers possess better knowledge for 
product movements throughout the supply chain and detailed information concerning 
the performance of products (e.g. sales, promotion etc.) and product categories (Burt 
& Sparks, 2003); this kind of information is valuable for the supplier. In some cases, 
retailers are unwilling to share relevant information with suppliers (Fearne et al., 
2004) or do so with considerable cost for suppliers (Duffy et al., 2003). In this 
situation, there is informational asymmetry between retailers and suppliers (Hingley 
2005a,b) and retailers capitalise on this especially during contract negotiations with 
suppliers to achieve better trade terms (Hingley et al., 2006). Suppliers may also 
possess information which is valuable for the retailer such as a better knowledge of 
the category (Morgan et al., 2007); however, our study focuses on the information 
held by retailers and the subsequent information asymmetry that could enable retailers 
to achieve higher benefits and gains. Based on the previous points, we hypothesize 
that: 
Η3: There is a positive association between informational asymmetry and the benefits 
retailers enjoy emanating from their use of commercial practices with suppliers. 
 
2.4 Behavioral uncertainty and retailers’ commercial practices 
Behavioral uncertainty refers to difficulties in evaluating a partner’s performance 
following a contractual agreement (Crosno & Dahlstrom, 2008). In that occasion, the 
firm can be exploited by the partner (Crosno & Dahlstrom, 2008). This relates to 
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power asymmetry as the weaker chain member could not possess the appropriate 
mechanisms to monitor the behavior of the other members and to ensure that the 
terms of the agreement are met (Nyaga et al., 2013; Kumar et al., 2001). For example 
a supplier may not be able to monitor whether a discount given to a retailer is passed 
on to consumers and if it is not passed on then the retailer increases its profit margin 
(Gómez et al., 2007; Kumar et al., 2001). Equally, an implementation of monitoring 
mechanisms could be expensive and could not be afforded by every organization 
(Handley & Benton, 2012). The above are of particular relevance to food supply 
chains where trade agreements contain a wide range of terms and conditions (Fearne 
et al., 2005). Here, retailers may not fully comply with all parts of the agreement 
especially when dealing with weaker suppliers who can not monitor effectively the 
implementation of these agreements and they are of relatively low value to retailers 
(Gómez et al., 2007; Kasulis et al., 1999). On the other hand, retailers may need to 
monitor suppliers’ performance too but their monitoring capabilities are significant, 
reducing any attempt by suppliers to exploit them (Nyaga et al., 2013; Morgan et al., 
2007). Overall, our study examines determinants which allow retailers to use these 
commercial practices. Subsequently, we focused on retailers’ behavioral uncertainty 
which is a major limiting factor for suppliers wanting to evaluate retailers’ 
performance. Based on these points, we hypothesize that: 
Η4: There is a positive association between behavioral uncertainty and the benefits 
retailers enjoy due to their use of commercial practices with suppliers. 
 
3. Context and methodology 
3.1 Context 
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This study examines relationships between suppliers and retailers in the Greek food 
supply chain where many changes have taken place during the past decades including 
the advent of many international manufacturers (e.g. Coca Cola Company, Unilever, 
Nestlé, Kraft Foods, Heineken) and retailers (e.g. Carrefour, Delhaize Le Lion, Lidl). 
The Greek food retail sector is highly concentrated where the top five retailers 
account for 56% of the grocery retail market (ICAP, 2013); the latter also indicates 
high suppliers’ dependence on these retailers (Hingley, 2005b). Other important 
changes include a significant investment in logistics and information technology 
infrastructure by major retailers (Menachof et al., 2009) providing them with 
information about product movement and sales performance (Burt & Sparks, 2003). 
In relation to information exchange, Pramatari & Miliotis (2008) stress that a better 
and more efficient flow of information is required between retailers and suppliers as 
retailers are not keen to share information with suppliers and, therefore, conditions of 
information asymmetry are created. Own brands showed a rapid growth during the 
past years accounting for 20.7% of total grocery retail sales (ICAP, 2012). Overall, 
these changes have transformed the Greek food supply chain from a traditional to a 
modern supply chain representing a good “laboratory” for analyzing retailers’ 
commercial practices. 
 
3.2 Qualitative phase of methodology 
In-depth interviews were employed with twenty stakeholders aiming to provide 
insights for the imbalanced supplier-retailer relationships in the Greek market and the 
various ways retailers are exercising their power to obtain higher gains. The 
qualitative phase of our study aims to provide insights for: a) the major determinants 
of the commercial practices followed by retailers, b) the most significant of these 
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practices (i.e. accounting for a significant part of the examined commercial exchanges 
and they are the most common ones) which are a reflection of retail power and, c) for 
the importance of these practices for suppliers. Interviews took place with eleven 
trade managers working for suppliers and they were also responsible for the 
development and negotiation of the annual commercial agreements with retailers. 
Four trade managers were employed by international companies and the rest were 
trade managers employed by local companies. In that way, we obtained information 
from a variety of suppliers increasing the generalization of our results. In addition, 
two journalists employed by the leading Greek grocery retail magazine were 
interviewed too. They specialize in supplier-retailer collaboration and provided an 
independent viewpoint for the examined relationships. We also interviewed five 
senior academics who were experts in Marketing and Supply Chain Management and 
who had significant knowledge of supplier-retailer relationships in the food sector. 
Finally, we interviewed two store managers working for major retailers. It is worth 
mentioning that, in Greece, store managers influence the commercial agreement 
between retailers and suppliers and their view is critical for various issues including 
the current and future sales performance of various products (ICAP, 2013). Therefore, 
these store managers provided important information concerning the supplier-retailer 
relationships. Overall, we interviewed a variety of Greek food supply chain 
stakeholders meeting the target population of the qualitative phase and obtaining a 
holistic view of supplier-retailer relationships.  
The interviews took place during April-May 2012, lasted 60 to 120 minutes and were 
conducted face‐to‐face. These interviews preliminarily confirmed the role of the four 
determinants (dependence, financial goal incompatibility, informational asymmetry 
and behavioral uncertainty) in relation to retailers’ practices. For the latter, a list of 35 
13 
 
commercial practices were identified (see Table A in Appendix, under (a): “Practice 
identified in the literature”) following an extensive review of relevant research papers 
and market reports (European Commission, 2013; Comisión Nacional de la 
Competencia, 2011; Gómez & Rubio, 2008; UK Competition Commission, 2008; 
Dobson, 2005; Fearne et al., 2005; Towill, 2005; Fearne et al., 2004; Burt & Sparks, 
2003; Duffy et al., 2003; Moberg & Speh, 2003; Kumar et al., 2001; Carter, 2000; 
Murry & Heide, 1998). We acknowledge that there are various reports which include 
a greater number of commercial practices followed by retailers [e.g. UK Competition 
Commission report (2008) including 52 practices]. Nevertheless, our aim was not to 
include all practices but to aggregate the most common and the most significant ones. 
These practices were given to interviewees who were prompted to suggest other 
significant practices not included in the list. Five practices not identified in our 
literature review (see Table A in Appendix, second column, “Practice identified in 
qualitative phase”) were revealed and were included in the list with the examined 
determinants. 40 practices in total were finally listed. Only 24 practices were highly 
significant based on interviewees’ comments and these formulated the main part of 
our survey (see Table A in Appendix, under (b): “Practice confirmed as significant in 
the qualitative phase and included in the survey’s questionnaire”). The remaining 
practices were rejected as were insignificant or rarely occurring (see Table A in 
Appendix, under (c): “Practice rejected in the qualitative phase”). Open-ended 
questions were used based on an interview guide to encourage respondents to 
comment on these practices in general and on their relative importance for suppliers. 
Other open-ended questions aimed to confirm the four determinants identified in the 
literature. Information concerning other potential determinants (e.g. business 
environmental uncertainty) was also obtained; however, it was contradictory and not 
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valid and, hence, these determinants were rejected. The interviews provided useful 
insights for the design of the survey that follows in the next section.  
 
3.3 Quantitative phase of methodology 
3.3.1 Sampling and data collection 
A survey was conducted with suppliers of branded, packaged food products, dealing 
with the five major retailers of the Greek market. We excluded own brand suppliers as 
they have a different relationship with retailers, depending largely on retailers as they 
manufacture exclusively for them. We also excluded primary producers since their 
relationships with retailers may also have different dynamics. Following a systematic 
search of appropriate business directories (e.g. ICAP Business Directory), we 
identified 2608 firms which were potential participants of our survey. The survey 
commenced in June 2012 and was completed in October 2012. Respondents were 
initially contacted via telephone, the purpose of the research was presented and 
confidentiality was assured. In case the participants needed further information about 
the purpose of the research or more time to decide the exact date and time of the 
appointment, an email was sent including further detailed information. In the end, 420 
telephone surveys were conducted with an average length of 40 minutes. 22 
questionnaires were unusable and were excluded from the analysis; hence, our final 
sample contained 398 food suppliers. This represents a satisfactory response rate 
(15.26%) given the sensitivity of the requested information and similar response rates 
have been achieved in relevant studies (see Morgan et al., 2007).  
43% of the respondents were sales managers, 19% were trade managers, 6% were 
owners and 3% were general managers indicating that our respondents are appropriate 
for our study (see Table B in Appendix). These respondents have been negotiating and 
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conducting agreements with retailers. These respondents have been working in their 
firms and the food sector for 13.1 years and 15.7 years on average respectively (see 
Table B in Appendix) which provides an indication of their satisfactory level of 
knowledge and experience regarding the workings of their firm, the sector and 
supplier-retailer relationships in particular. The size of the firms was measured by the 
number of employees and the annual turnover and the scales used were based on 
guidelines followed by the European Commission for measuring firm size and 
distinguishing small and medium size enterprises (European Commission, 2005). Our 
sample includes firms representing every Greek region; in terms of firm size, our 
sample (see Table B in Appendix) is also representative of the Greek food sector 
where SMEs account approximately 90% of the market (Greek Foundation of 
Economic and Industrial Research, 2012; Lambrinopoulou & Tregear, 2011). 
Our final sample included a wide range of food product categories including dairy 
products, meat products, wine, cooking oils, frozen vegetables, bread, pasta, pulses, 
rice and confectionary. We suggested to the interviewees to provide answers based on 
an “average”, typical trade relationship they have with retailers (not the best or the 
worst relationship), as defined by Moberg & Speh (2003). In this way, we avoided 
biased responses that could emanate from good or bad experiences. Various empirical 
studies have also used this approach when examining buyer-supplier relationships 
(see Lado et al., 2008; Moberg & Speh, 2003).  
 
3.3.2 Questionnaire and variable measures 
The unit of analysis is the dyadic power relationship between suppliers and retailers. 
It is worth noting that collecting dyadic data is the optimum approach to examine 
buyer-supplier relationships. However, many past studies have focused on one side of 
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the dyad when examining similar issues (see work from Wang et al., 2012; Mysen et 
al., 2011; Skarmeas et al., 2008; Morgan et al., 2007) and we have followed this 
approach in this study. The survey was based on a questionnaire including three 
sections related to determinants, retailers’ commercial practices and demographic 
issues for our interviewees and their firms (see Table C in Appendix). Measures of the 
four determinants were operationalised by multi-item scales adapted from similar 
studies examining buyer-supplier relationships (Table 1). Seven-point scales were 
used and anchored (1= “totally disagree” and 7= “totally agree”) as recommended by 
Preston & Colman (2000), Birkett (1986) and other relevant studies (see Chao, 2011; 
Zhou & Poppo, 2010; Morgan et al., 2007; Shervani et al., 2007; Griffith & Myers, 
2005; Batt, 2003; Jap & Anderson, 2003; Bergen et al., 1998; Lusch & Brown, 1996; 
Stump & Heide, 1996) from where items employed in this survey were sourced.  
     
    “Insert Table 1 here” 
Four items were used to measure supplier’s dependence on retailers. We examined 
different aspects of dependence. We focused on cost and impact of a potential 
termination of the relationship with a supplier (Mysen et al., 2011; Morgan et al., 
2007; Noorderhaven et al., 1998) and on the replaceability of key customers (Mysen 
et al., 2011); the latter issue is important because when a partner generates benefits for 
the firm that can not be easily replaced, then the firm is dependent on the partner 
(Kumar, 2005). Three items evaluated suppliers’ perceptions in terms of financial goal 
incompatibility between their firm and retailers. We focused on the degree of conflict 
between the financial goals of the dyad (Yang et al., 2012) and the level of retailers’ 
support to suppliers for achieving suppliers’ financial objectives (Jap & Anderson, 
2003). The literature also lacks measures of informational asymmetry. In general, 
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informational asymmetry stems from a lack of information sharing between partners 
(Wu, 2008; Sako & Helper, 1998; Griffith & Myers, 2005; Mohr & Spekman, 1994; 
Chao, 2011; Shervani et al., 2007). To measure that determinant, four items were 
employed focusing on issues like the avoidance of retailers to share useful 
information (such as performance of the product category or events that could affect 
suppliers) with suppliers (Griffith & Myers, 2005; Sako & Helper, 1998; Mohr & 
Spekman, 1994). Retailers’ behavioral uncertainty was captured by three questions 
focusing on suppliers’ difficulty to monitor retailers’ performance according to 
contractual agreements (Chao, 2011; Shervani et al., 2007). The final questionnaire 
included 24 commercial practices followed by retailers (see Table C in Appendix). A 
seven-point, Likert-type scale was used (1= “never” and 7= “in a high degree”) to 
examine these practices. Demographic questions gathered information regarding the 
respondents’ firm and the respondents themselves. We paid particular attention to pre-
testing our questionnaire considering the scarcity of relevant academic work (and the 
subsequent scarcity of appropriate measures and factors for these issues). The 
questionnaire was pre-tested with five practitioners, four senior academics and 
managers from twenty firms. These participants have not contributed to previous 
phases of our work and were excluded from the sample of our final empirical work. 
We received comments about the inclusion of some questions (e.g. for reverse coded 
question in the case of commercial practices) and their wording which were 
incorporated in the research instrument.  
 
4. Data analysis and results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
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Our sample includes primarily small and medium sized firms which have long-term 
relationships with retailers (see Table B in Appendix). The results of the descriptive 
analysis (see Table D in Appendix) showed that suppliers’ dependence on retailers is 
evaluated relatively high (construct mean=5.00) illustrating an asymmetric 
relationship in retailers’ favour. Informational asymmetry is in retailers’ favour and is 
relatively high (construct mean=4.86) indicating that suppliers are not getting 
valuable information from retailers. This is in accordance with relevant argument 
given by Pramatari & Miliotis (2008) for the Greek market further suggesting that 
there is a room for improvement in their collaboration. Suppliers’ and retailers’ 
financial goals are not congruent (construct mean=4.40) and behavioural uncertainty 
enjoys a moderate evaluation (construct mean=3.84). The last point could be related 
to the finding from the qualitative part of the study where it was noted that there are 
suppliers, usually the larger, who are capable of monitoring retailers’ behaviour 
effectively. The overall mean of the 24 examined practices is 4.42 (range of values: 
3.54 to 5.15) (please see Table D in Appendix) indicating an average and, in some 
cases, frequent occurrence of the practices. The resulted skewness and kurtosis (Table 
D in Appendix) indicate that all data are deemed suitable for subsequent analyses.  
Overall, it can be suggested that the application of retail power via the use of these 
practices is prevalent in the Greek food supply chain. This was also revealed in the 
qualitative phase of our study. For example, a respondent mentioned: “These practices 
are part of my daily routine (i.e. as a trade manager)”. Nevertheless, the interviews 
revealed that each supplier-retailer relationship is unique and that these practices do 
not apply universally. The level of application of retailers’ power will depend on the 
exchange parties involved. In relation to this, a respondent argued: “Retailers exert 
less pressure on suppliers having well-developed marketing plans for their products 
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than on suppliers which are less organised. In the former case, retailers anticipate 
long term gains while in the latter case, retailers anticipate short term gains”.   
 
4.2 Factor structure and measure validation for commercial practices 
The examined commercial practices are inter-related applications of retailers’ power 
increasing retailers’ benefits in their imbalanced relationships with suppliers. In some 
cases, different characteristics between practices can be observed (e.g. concerning the 
part of the relationship they are applied); hence, it is likely that they may be grouped 
differently. In addition, there have been no previous studies examining the grouping of 
these practices. Here, we could employ Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) to 
investigate the underlying factors and enhance our understanding of the 
interrelationships between the examined practices (Hair et al., 2009). The results of 
the EFA were validated through Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and we split the 
sample randomly in two random samples to conduct the two analyses separately 
(Earp, 2005). We used Oblimin rotation and Maximum Likelihood factor extraction 
on the first half of the sample to create parameter estimates that are most likely to 
have emanated from the observed correlation matrix (Garson, 2013; Hair et al., 2009). 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (1244, p<0.000) and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
statistic (0,894) confirmed the suitability of these items for factor analysis (Wang et 
al., 2013). EFA results provided a clear three factor solution. The decision to drop 
items was based on statistical criteria proposed by Hair et al. (2009). As a result, a few 
items were dropped that showed loadings <0.5 or communalities <0.5. Internal 
consistency analysis showed that Cronbach’s α for each of these factors (Table 2) is 
over the standard agreed threshold of 0.70 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). We provided 
meaningful names for each factor (see Table 2) based on practices loaded on each 
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factor. The four items loaded on the first factor relate to contractual agreements 
between suppliers and retailers; here, retailers exercise their power and modify parts 
of the agreement unilaterally. Thus, we name this factor as “unanticipated changes in 
agreements”. The mean of this factor is 3.83 indicating an average occurrence of these 
practices (see Table D in Appendix).  
The four items loaded on the second factor relate to payments which suppliers provide 
to retailers. One item indicates that suppliers have to pay upfront and are not paying 
based on a percentage of product turnover. This factor is named as “upfront 
payments” and is another method which retailers use to enhance their benefits. This 
occurs in a higher degree (mean=4.38; see Table D in Appendix) compared to 
“unanticipated changes in agreements”.  
Four variables had high loadings on the third factor and were related to negotiation 
tactics and pressures that retailers use to gain better terms from suppliers. Hence, the 
third factor is named as “negotiation pressures”. “Negotiation pressures” are 
comparably the most frequent practices in supplier-retailer relationships (mean=4.83 
see Table D in Appendix). These three factors explain cumulatively 66.97% of the 
variance in data.  
Concerning the dropped items, some were conceptually distinct from the revealed 
groups. An example is the practice concerning retailers’ favoring own brands against 
branded (suppliers’) products (practice 1, Table A in Appendix) that can not be 
considered as an “upfront payment” nor “negotiation pressures” nor “unanticipated 
changes” to an agreement. Similarly, the practice about retailers’ lack of financial 
contribution to promotional activities (e.g. buy one get one free promotion, practice 7 
in Table A in Appendix) can not be grouped within the revealed factors. On the other 
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hand, the practice of payment delay without a good cause (practice 25 in Table A in 
Appendix) may need further examination due to its reported significance.  
    “Insert Table 2 here” 
 
Apart from EFA, reliability analysis and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) were 
applied in the second half of the sample to purify and validate the three factors 
(Gerbing & Anderson, 1988). Composite reliability was computed to assess the 
reliability of the scales (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The composite reliability values 
derived, are over the minimum accepted value of 0.60 (Hair et al., 2009) for all three 
scales (Table 3). Therefore, the scales showed high reliability. The Average Variance 
Extracted (AVE) values are above the suggested criterion of 0.50 (Fornell & Larcker, 
1981) (Table 3). CFA was applied to our data to assess convergent validity of the 
three factors. These factors relate to commercial practices emanating from retail 
power; hence, we can assume that a higher-order factor accounts for covariance 
between the three factors (Skarmeas et al., 2008). The model fit indices are as follows: 
χ2=90.2 (df=51), p=0.001, GFI=0.941, CFI=0.968, RMSEA=0.058, IFI=0.968. These 
indices are acceptable compared with the threshold values suggested by Hair et al. 
(2009). In addition, all standardized loadings are greater than 0.60 and significant 
(Table 3) providing evidence of convergent validity. Second-order loadings are also 
large and significant (Table 3). The correlation of any two constructs is less than the 
square root of the AVE for each of the two constructs indicating discriminant validity 
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981).  
    “Insert Table 3 here” 
 
4.3 Measure validation for determinants 
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We applied CFA on the whole sample to validate the scales of the determinants 
(Gerbing & Anderson, 1988); Composite reliabilities range from 0.76 to 0.88 and the 
AVE values exceed the generally accepted threshold of 0.50 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981, 
Table 4). A measurement model was estimated for the four first-order constructs of 
dependence, goal incompatibility, informational asymmetry and behavioural 
uncertainty. The fit indices of CFA are as follows: χ2=80.79 (df=71), p=0.20, 
GFI=0.972, CFI=0.995, RMSEA=0.019, IFI=0.995. These indices are acceptable 
compared with the threshold values suggested by Hair et al. (2009). Standardized 
loadings are higher than 0.60 and significant (Table 4) providing evidence of 
convergent validity. The correlation of any two constructs is less than the square root 
of the AVE for each of the two constructs indicating discriminant validity (Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981). 
    “Insert Table 4 here” 
 
4.4 Results from structural model and hypotheses testing 
The measurement model shows goodness of fit indices that indicate a good fit: 
χ2=383.34 (df=278), p=0.00, GFI=0.931, CFI=0.976, RMSEA=0.031, IFI=0.976. 
Following the confirmation of the measurement model, the hypothesized model was 
tested via the use of structural equation modelling (AMOS 19) applied in the whole 
sample to examine the impact of the four determinants on the second-order factor of 
commercial practices (which encompasses three factors of practices: “upfront 
payments”, “unanticipated changes in agreements” and “negotiation pressures”). The 
results of the model are illustrated in Figure 2 along with the standardized 
coefficients. The goodness-of-fit indices for our structural model are as follows: 
χ2=395.70 (df=286), p=0.00, GFI=0.929, CFI=0.975, RMSEA=0.031, IFI=0.975. 
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These indices are acceptable when compared to the threshold values suggested by 
Hair et al (2009) and indicate that the overall fit of the model is good.  
    “Insert Figure 2 here” 
 
Table 5 displays the relevant correlations, AVE and construct reliability for all the 
latents of the model. The results show that the estimated model covers the 
assumptions pertaining to convergent and discriminant validity. All the constructs 
exceed the generally accepted threshold of 0.60 for construct reliability (Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981). 
    “Insert Table 5 here” 
 
The results support the four hypotheses and confirm the developed conceptual model 
(Table 6). Suppliers’ dependence on retailers has a positive (0.193) and significant 
(p<0.01) impact on retailers’ use of commercial practices allowing retailers to gain 
many supply chain relationship benefits. A higher suppliers’ dependency on retailers 
allows retailers to gain a disproportionate share of benefits compared to suppliers by 
requiring various upfront payments or by implementing unanticipated changes in 
agreements or by exerting pressure during negotiations. This was also highlighted 
during the qualitative interviews and according to one of the respondents:  
“… Suppliers need to be careful and vigilant. Therefore, suppliers need to expand 
their customer base and, subsequently decrease their dependence on retailers 
otherwise it will be easier for retailers to exert more pressure on suppliers”. The 
higher the supplier’s dependency on the retailer is, the more frequent the practices are 
being applied. These findings provide support for Hypothesis 1.  
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Financial goal incompatibility between suppliers and retailers has a positive (0.365) 
and significant (p<0.01) impact on retailers’ use of commercial practices. These 
findings provide support for Hypothesis 2 and confirm that the lack of congruence 
between the financial goals of suppliers and retailers fosters the application of 
retailers’ power. This was stressed in the qualitative phase of our study as well:  
“… at the end of the day, each party wants to achieve its own financial goals… 
Retailers may exert pressure on us (i.e. suppliers) to improve their own financial 
performance targets and these do not necessarily align with ours”. The larger the goal 
incompatibility is, the more frequently these practices are used; in this way, retailers 
pursue their own financial objectives but at the expense of suppliers. It should be 
noted that the interviews also reported some relationships where both suppliers and 
retailers share similar goals and aim towards a win-win situation. 
Our results also show that informational asymmetry is positively linked to retailers’ 
use of commercial practices (0.149, p<0.05); hence, Hypothesis 3 is supported. This 
finding indicates that retailers may take advantage of possessing information that is 
valuable for the supplier in order to obtain better trading terms through three groups 
of practices. This was mentioned during a qualitative interview:  
“Retailers know their customers (i.e. consumers) better than us (i.e. suppliers); 
retailers can use this knowledge to achieve better trade terms”. During the qualitative 
part of the study, it was also indicated that there are cases where key account 
managers (working for suppliers) develop close relationships with retail buyers. In 
that way, key account managers may be able to get better, more insightful information 
from retail buyers for the ways consumers purchase suppliers’ products; the latter may 
help to reduce information asymmetry in that relationship.   
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Finally, our findings also support Hypothesis 4. Behavioral uncertainty has a positive 
(0.133) and significant (p<0.05) impact on retailers’ use of commercial practices. 
Suppliers’ difficulty in monitoring retailers’ compliance to their agreement enables 
retailers to exploit this situation and achieve higher gains. No indirect effects between 
the four determinants and the three factors of commercial practices were revealed in 
our analysis. Hence, the results illustrate that each determinant has a similar effect on 
each of the three factors.  
    “Insert Table 6 here” 
 
In our structural model, commercial practices are viewed as a second order construct. 
To evaluate whether our data are explained sufficiently by the second-order structural 
model, we tested an alternative model (based on the approach followed by Skarmeas 
et al., 2008). The alternative model proposes that “upfront payments”, “unanticipated 
changes in agreements” and “negotiation pressures” are distinct, dependent variables 
rather than dimensions of a higher order factor. The results below were obtained 
following a test of the alternative structural model: χ2=574.17 (df=281), p=0.00, 
GFI=0.894, CFI=0.932, RMSEA=0.051, IFI=0.933. The fit indices of the alternative 
model are considerably worse than our initial structural model, the former was found 
more parsimonious. Therefore, our initial model provides a better explanation of the 
data than this alternative model.  
 
5. Discussion 
In this paper, we developed and tested a model that examined retailers’ commercial 
practices towards suppliers and we identified significant determinants of this model: 
goal incompatibility, dependence, informational asymmetry, behavioral uncertainty.  
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Our findings highlight that the financial goal incompatibility is the most significant 
determinant of retailers’ commercial practices. This is in harmony with prior work by 
Gómez & Rubio (2008) who noted that financial goal incompatibility is a critical 
factor affecting the sharing of commercial benefits. Our results in relation to financial 
goal incompatibilities between retailers and suppliers also confirm past studies in the 
food supply chain literature (see Dobson, 2005; Murry & Heide, 1998). 
The current work stress that suppliers’ dependence is the second most significant 
determinant of retailers’ application of power and is consistent with various studies 
that have empirically confirmed the association between dependence and the attempt 
of the less dependent party to exploit the other (Wang et al., 2012; Mysen et al., 2011). 
In addition, our findings confirm Dobson’s (2005) assertion that retailers in the food 
chain may attempt to increase their benefits by exploiting suppliers’ dependence on 
them. The degree of suppliers’ dependence on retailers is found to be relatively high 
giving further evidence for the imbalanced relationships in the food chain (Fearne et 
al., 2005; Hingley, 2005b). The latter also supports Blundel & Hingley’s (2001) 
assertion that SMEs are subject to high retailers’ power. However, our sample 
included large suppliers as well and this could be a reason for the overall dependence 
scores not being higher.  
Informational asymmetry enjoyed a positive association with the use of commercial 
practices by retailers that is in line with past studies (Hingley, 2006; Duffy et al., 
2003). Our findings also validate other empirical studies which showed that the 
sharing of benefits between partners is affected by the level of information each one 
possesses (see Sako & Helper, 1998). The positive association between behavioral 
uncertainty and retailers’ use of commercial practices was also proved. This is 
consistent with the study of Wang et al. (2012) that empirically verified the link 
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between behavioral uncertainty and self-interest seeking behavior at the expense of 
the partner. The inability of suppliers to monitor retailers’ performance gives further 
evidence towards the asymmetric nature of the examined relationship [see Kumar et 
al. (2001)]. The above points have addressed successfully the first research question.  
In relation to the second research question, our analysis revealed 24 significant 
commercial practices (see Practices with (b) highlighted in Italics, Table A in 
Appendix) which were the outcome of the qualitative phase of the study (see Table A 
in Appendix, a,b,c,d). Some significant practices identified include, inter alia, the 
extra payments given from suppliers, retailers’ favoring own brands against branded 
suppliers’ products, payment delays without a good cause etc. Our findings show that 
the application of retail power through various commercial practices is a common 
phenomenon in food supply chain relationships that is consistent with work by the 
European Commission (2013) and UK Competition Commission (2008).  
It is worth mentioning that the qualitative part of our study revealed five new 
practices which were not previously identified in the literature (see Table A in 
Appendix, column: Source of practice, “Practice identified in qualitative phase”) 
indicating that retailers are constantly trying to find new ways to increase their share 
of gains. The latter also supports the relevant argument by Towill (2005) for the 
various “ingenious ways” that retailers use at the expense of suppliers. A subsequent, 
key finding of our study is the illustration of three major factors / groupings 
epitomizing the avenues in which retailers exercise their power: “upfront payments”, 
“unanticipated changes in agreements” and “negotiation pressures”.  
Equally, a high number of significant commercial practices revealed, shedding further 
light on the third research question. These practices are perceived as highly important 
by suppliers confirming other relevant reports [see Comisión Nacional de la 
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Competencia (2011) and UK Competition Commission (2008)] whilst their moderate 
and, in some cases, frequent level of occurrence denotes, under an implicit manner, 
their relative importance too. The above shows that suppliers feel significant pressure 
to accept retailers’ trading terms and the weaker the suppliers are, the higher the 
pressure they feel, confirming past work by Emerson (1962). However, the 
unexpected character of some of these practices (e.g. “unanticipated changes of 
agreements”) indicates greater pressure affecting suppliers’ planning. In addition, one 
of the revealed, new practices from the qualitative part of the study (see Practice 27, 
Table A in the Appendix) refers to retailers’ requirements for extra financial support 
from suppliers which will help retailers to achieve their annual economic objectives. 
This practice could be an indication that as the power imbalance is continuously 
increasing in retailers’ favour, retailers may use new, more direct practices in order to 
obtain higher gains from suppliers; subsequently, the pressure felt by suppliers may 
increase. Overall, the extensive application of retail power influences the supplier-
retailer relationship or could even damage the relationship itself (Nyaga et al., 2013). 
The qualitative interviews revealed similar dynamics in power imbalanced 
relationships between powerful suppliers and weaker retailers but the examination of 
these relationships is beyond the scope of this study. 
 
6. Conclusions, managerial and policy implications 
Power is highly relevant for understanding food supply chain relationships where an 
asymmetrical distribution of power has been observed with retailers exercising their 
power through various commercial practices (Hingley, 2005b). Fearne et al. (2005), 
Fearne et al. (2004) and Duffy et al. (2003) noted relevant practices perceived by 
suppliers as examples of unfair distribution of benefits. Our study provides further 
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empirical evidence for the practices followed by retailers and, to our knowledge, it is 
the first study that views these practices as an “avenue” for the unequal distribution of 
benefits in that asymmetric, though stable supplier-retailer relationship. Moreover, the 
development and empirically testing of a conceptual model that describes the 
application of retailers’ power is an original contribution of our exploratory study 
considering that our existing knowledge derives from various reports (Comisión 
Nacional de la Competencia, 2011; European Commission, 2013; UK Competition 
Commission, 2008) and very few academic studies [see Kumar et al. (2001); Gómez 
& Rubio (2008)]. Hence, our work presents a unique contribution to the current 
literature of power-imbalanced relationships and supports a better understanding of 
the manifestations of power in the dyadic supplier-retailer relationships and the 
perceived pressures emanating from them. Another key contribution of our work 
relates to the fact that we examined the importance of these practices based on 
suppliers’ perceptions filling a major gap in the relevant literature. Hence, we provide 
valuable insights for the role and importance of these practices supporting work by 
Nyaga et al. (2013) who stressed that power imbalance does not necessarily include 
conflict but it may create risks and challenges for the weaker party. Furthermore, the 
significant pressure that these practices create to suppliers could be linked to the issue 
of tolerance as proposed by Hingley (2005a). Therefore, any other extra pressure by 
retailers towards suppliers could be intolerable by suppliers and could have an impact 
on the stability of that dyadic relationship.  
Our study will be of large interest to managers. Specifically, managers employed by 
suppliers could be better prepared for trade negotiations with retailers and could have 
a better understanding of the ways retailers exercise their power. New suppliers 
entering the market are not aware of the extent to which these practices are used. 
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Suppliers should measure the actual financial costs of these practices and the precise 
impact they have to sustain profitability in their operations. The recognition of the 
determinants of these practices could give extra insights to managers where to focus 
their efforts to reduce their occurrence. For example, these managers could develop 
appropriate strategies to reduce suppliers’ dependence on retailers especially when the 
higher the supplier’s dependency on the retailer is, the more frequent these practices 
are applied. Hence, suppliers could try to diversify their sales portfolio by selling to a 
range of retailers and alternative distribution channels. Another possibility may be for 
suppliers to join forces by forming “selling groups / alliances” following the example 
of retailers which formulated similar buying groups in the past (see Mc Goldrick, 
2002). Similarly, smaller suppliers may focus on producing highly differentiated 
products that could improve their position in the highly competitive market. In that 
way, suppliers may be able to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis retailers’ 
power. More importantly, these managers should be always alert and prepared to deal 
with increasing retailers’ demands including new ways engineered by retailers 
constantly to increase their gains. Managers working for suppliers should specify in 
detail all elements of the agreement with retailers and should avoid any obscure terms. 
In addition, they should seek agreements where the trade terms offered to retailers are 
proportional to the amount of sales achieved and not related to upfront lump sum 
payments.  
Equally, our work provides many insights to retail managers who could implement 
practices which alleviate pressure on suppliers. For example, avoiding payment delays 
will be extremely beneficial to many suppliers as this occurrence creates significant 
pressures to their financial liquidity; this is a particular concern for small suppliers. 
Retail managers should also avoid demanding new, unanticipated payments or 
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implementing any other ad hoc changes to the commercial agreement with suppliers 
as these will have a negative impact on suppliers’ financial position and they may 
threaten suppliers’ business existence (especially for SMEs). Hence, this work can 
serve as a guide for retailers aiming to improve their Corporate Social Responsibility 
status. In addition, managers working for Tier 2 suppliers (e.g. suppliers which 
provide raw material and other ingredients to Tier 1 suppliers which, in turn, 
manufacture final products for retailers) need to become more aware regarding 
downstream supply chain relationships. In this way, Tier 2 suppliers could be better 
prepared in case Tier 1 suppliers try to offset their losses due to pressures from 
retailers by putting pressures to Tier 2 suppliers.  
Many policy implications emanate from this study. Policy makers should be aware 
that the pressure felt by suppliers for specific retailers’ practices could raise many 
concerns for the future, long-term sustainability of that chain. Therefore, practices 
creating this pressure and considered as highly important by suppliers should be 
avoided. Appropriate policies could be developed to minimize that pressure and 
relevant incentives could be implemented for the increased flow of information 
between these partners. In addition, policy makers should aim to protect SMEs since 
smaller firms are equally affected (or even more) by imbalanced relationships.  
Finally, there are a few limitations to this study. One limitation is that our work 
examined the Greek food supply chain. Future research analyzing other national 
chains and other sectors could be very beneficial and it could reveal potential new 
practices not identified in this study. It should be noted that the practices followed by 
retailers remain the same irrespectively of the retail market involved (European 
Commission, 2013; ICAP, 2013; Comisión Nacional de la Competencia, 2011; UK 
Competition Commission, 2008; Dobson, 2005). In addition, the increased 
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internationalization of the food supply chain and the international expansion of major 
retailers (Fernie, 2014b) could accelerate the use of these practices suggesting the 
need for future research on this topic. Our work analyzed only suppliers’ views and 
future research capturing retailers’ views will be extremely useful for understanding 
power-related issues in this dyadic relationship. Moreover, SMEs accounted for a 
large part of our sample and potential differences in the pressures felt by smaller and 
larger suppliers could be investigated. Possible inter-relationships between the 
determinants could be examined including further analysis on informational 
asymmetry that is in retailers’ favor and increases suppliers’ dependence on retailers. 
Considering the exploratory nature of our study, further examination of the practices 
is needed to confirm the revealed groups of practices or reveal new ones. Finally, a 
vignette is presented in the Appendix illustrating the imbalanced nature of supplier-
retailer relationships and it also incorporates specific issues raised during the 
qualitative part of this study. Overall, the vignette provides many managerial insights 
and shows two contrasting cases of retailers in relation to the use of various 
commercial and business practices with suppliers.  
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Figure 1. Conceptual model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Results from hypothesized structure model 
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     TABLES 
 
Table 1: Measures of Determinants  
Measures Source of 
measures 
Dependence
a 
Mysen et al., 
2011; 
Morgan et al., 
2007; 
Noorderhave
n et al., 1998 
DEP1-It would be costly to lose these customers 
DEP2-We are dependent on these customers 
DEP3-If we lose this customer, it will be very difficult to maintain our 
current total level of sales 
DEP4-We cannot afford to lose this customer 
Goal incompatibility
a 
Yang et al., 
2012; Wong 
et al., 2005; 
Batt, 2003; 
Jap & 
Anderson, 
2003 
GI1-Our company works with retailers and we have different financial 
goals 
GI2-Retailers do not support our financial goals 
GI3-Meeting our firm’s financial goals clashes with meeting retailers’ 
financial goals 
Informational asymmetry
a 
Wu, 2008; 
Griffith & 
Myers, 2005; 
Wu & Choi, 
2004; Sako & 
Helper, 1998; 
Lusch & 
Brown, 1996; 
Mohr & 
Spekman, 
1994 
IA1-Retailers avoid sharing important information regarding our product 
category, competitors or the market in general 
IA2-Retailers usually do not share useful information and business 
knowledge 
IA3-Retailers usually do not share information or they do only if we ask 
them to or in case of information exchange agreement 
IA4-Retailers won’t volunteer to provide helpful information to us 
unless we ask them to 
Behavioral uncertainty
a 
Chao, 2011; 
Zhou & 
Poppo, 2010; 
Shervani et 
al., 2007; 
Bergen et al., 
1998; Stump 
& Heide, 
1996 
BU1-There would be significant costs associated with monitoring in 
detail whether retailers are performing all of their contractual obligations 
under our agreement 
BU2-Our commercial agreements with retailers refer to many stores, 
many promotional activities, products and commercial activities in 
general that is difficult to verify if they are performing their contractual 
obligations under the agreements 
BU3-It is easy to monitor whether retailers are performing their 
contractual obligations under our agreement
b 
a 
Based on a seven-point Likert-type scale (1=“totally disagree” to 7=“totally agree”) 
b
 Reverse coded item 
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Table 2: Exploratory factor analysis for commercial practices 
Construct Items Factor 
loadings 
Cronbach’s 
a 
Unanticipat
ed changes 
in 
agreements
a
,b,e
 
CP1-Ad-hoc unilateral change to an agreement 
concerning the number of products/ product codes 
that will be stocked without compensating the 
supplier
 
0.93 
0.83 
CP2-Ad-hoc unilateral change to an agreement 
concerning the number of stores where a product will 
be stocked without compensating the supplier 
0.68 
CP3-Ad-hoc unilateral change to an agreement 
concerning the number of in-store promotional 
activities that will take place without compensating 
the supplier 
0.68 
CP4-Obscure terms of agreement 0.56 
Upfront 
payments
a,c,
e
 
CP5-Extra payments as a condition for stocking 
products
e 0.88 
0.84 
CP6-Extra payments for better in-store positioning of 
products 
0.63 
CP7-Extra payments for new store openings 0.68 
CP8-Extra payments as a condition for stocking 
products or a better in-store positioning of products 
or new store openings or a supplier being included in 
a retailer’s brochure offer. These are upfront lump 
sum payments instead of paying a sum equivalent to 
a percentage of product turnover 
0.68 
Negotiation 
pressures
a,d,e
 
CP9-Forcing supplier’s prices down or refusing 
supplier’s justified price increases which occurred 
due to an increase in suppliers’ costs (e.g. increase in 
raw material prices) 
0.78 
0.82 
CP10-Falsely suggesting that competitive supplier is 
offering better trade terms 
0.62 
CP11-Exaggeration of seriousness of problems (e.g. 
low demand for a product) in order to gain extra 
concessions 
0.61 
CP12-Refuse to stock a product with a lower profit 
margin from a supplier with high amount of sales 
with the excuse of getting a higher average profit 
margin from other suppliers from that product 
category 
0.60 
a 
Factors interpreted from the pattern matrix following Oblimin rotation (Total variance 
explained: 66.97 %)  
b 
Eigenvalue of the factor “Unanticipated changes in agreements”: 5.591 
c Eigenvalue of the factor “Upfront payments”: 1.298 
d Eigenvalue of the factor “Negotiation pressures”: 1.148 
e 
Based on a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = “never” to 7= “in a high degree”) 
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Table 3: Second order confirmatory factor analysis for commercial practices 
Factors and items 
Standardized 
loading t-value 
Composit
e 
reliability AVE 
First-order factors 
Unanticipated changes in agreements     
CP1
a 
0.77 - 
0.822 
0.53
8 
CP2 0.79 9.660 
CP3 0.71 8.566 
CP4 0.65 7.875 
Upfront payments     
CP5
a 
0.85 - 
0.867 
0.62
0 
CP6 0.76 10.613 
CP7 0.74 10.357 
CP8 0.80 11.488 
Negotiation pressures     
CP9
a 
0.75 - 
0.822 
0.53
7 
CP10 0.77 8.848 
CP11 0.74 8.469 
CP12 0.67 7.697 
Second order factors     
Unanticipated changes in agreements
a 
0.85 - - - 
Upfront payments
 
0.95 7.253   
Negotiation pressures
 
0.73 6.562 - - 
a 
Item fixed to set the scale 
 
Table 4: First order confirmatory factor analysis for determinants 
Factors and items
a 
Standardized 
loading t-value 
Composite 
reliability AVE 
Dependence
a 
    
DEP1
b 
0.86 - 
0.88 0.65 
DEP2 0.76 16.89 
DEP3 0.83 18.96 
DEP4 0.76 16.83 
Goal incompatibility
a 
    
GI1
b 
0.73 - 
0.78 0.54 GI2 0.77 11.86 
GI3 0.70 11.46 
Informational asymmetry
a 
    
IA1
b 
0.76 - 
0.82 0.53 
IA2 0.75 13.58 
IA3 0.72 13.16 
IA4 0.69 12.62 
Behavioral uncertainty
a 
    
BU1
b 
0.72 - 
0.76 0.52 BU2 0.77 10.98 
BU3 (R) 0.66 10.55 
a 
Item fixed to set the scale 
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Table 5: Correlations of constructs 
Constructs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.Dependence 0.80
 
      
2.Goal incompatibility 0.02 0.73
 
     
3.Informational asymmetry -0.08 0.44 0.73
 
    
4.Behavioral uncertainty 0.16 0.33 0.31 0.72
 
   
5.Unanticipated changes in 
agreements 
0.11 0.36 0.29 0.29 0.75
 
  
6.Upfront payments 0.24 0.44 0.24 0.27 0.70 0.75
 
 
7.Negotiation pressures 0.16 0.37 0.31 0.27 0.68 0.67 0.73
 
Composite reliability 0.88 0.78 0.82 0.76 0.84 0.84 0.82 
Notes 
Values on the diagonal are the square-root of the average variance extracted for 
each construct (AVE) 
Convergent validity: AVE>0.50 
Discriminant validity: Sq. root AVE>|Corr| 
 
Table 6: Hypotheses tested  
H1:Dependence → (+) Retailers’ commercial practices Supported 
H2:Goal incompatibility → (+) Retailers’ commercial practices Supported 
H3:Informational asymmetry → (+) Retailers’ commercial practices Supported 
H4:Behavioral uncertainty → (+) Retailers’ commercial practices Supported 
 
 
    APPENDIX 
Table A: Commercial practices implemented by retailers impacting suppliers  
Practice Source of practice 
1. Favoring own brands against 
branded (suppliers’) productsa,b 
Comisión Nacional de la Competencia, 2011; 
Gómez & Rubio, 2008; UK Competition 
Commission, 2008 
2. Extra payments as a condition for 
stocking products
a,b
 
European Commission, 2013; Comisión Nacional 
de la Competencia, 2011; UK Competition 
Commission, 2008; Dobson, 2005; Burt & Sparks, 
2003; Moberg & Speh, 2003 
3. Extra payments for better in-store 
positioning of products
a,b
 
Comisión Nacional de la Competencia, 2011; UK 
Competition Commission, 2008; Dobson, 2005; 
4. Extra payments for new store 
openings
a,b
 
UK Competition Commission, 2008; Towill, 2005 
5. No extra payment is required by a 
supplier for being included in a 
retailer’s brochure offer b,d 
Practice identified in qualitative phase 
6. Extra payments as a condition for 
stocking products or a better in-store 
positioning of products or new store 
openings or a supplier being included 
in a retailer’s brochure offer. These 
are upfront lump sum payments 
instead of paying a sum equivalent to 
a percentage of product turnover
b
 
Practice identified in qualitative phase  
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7. Retailers do not contribute financially 
to promotional activities (e.g. buy one 
get one free promotion)
a,b
 
Comisión Nacional de la Competencia, 2011; UK 
Competition Commission, 2008; Dobson, 2005; 
Duffy et al., 2003 
8. Financial support for matching 
competing retailer’s lower pricea,b 
Comisión Nacional de la Competencia, 2011; UK 
Competition Commission, 2008; Dobson, 2005 
9. Payments for entering and remaining 
in retailer’s list of suppliersa,c 
European Commission, 2013; Comisión Nacional 
de la Competencia, 2011; UK Competition 
Commission, 2008; Dobson, 2005 
10. Compensation for not meeting targets 
for profits
a,c
 
UK Competition Commission, 2008; Dobson, 
2005; Towill, 2005 
11. Upfront lump sum payment for in-
store promotions
a,c
 
UK Competition Commission, 2008; Dobson, 
2005; Towill, 2005 
12. Charges for dealing with consumer 
complaints and product returns
a,c
 
UK Competition Commission, 2008; Towill, 
2005; Duffy et al., 2003 
13. Fines for unproven shortfalls in 
relation to product specification that 
could have originated at the store 
(e.g. through product mishandling or 
poor stock rotation)
a,c
 
UK Competition Commission, 2008; Dobson, 
2005; Duffy et al., 2003; Moberg & Speh, 2003 
14. Requirement for suppliers’ 
contribution to retrospective supply 
chain costs and services (e.g. costs of 
changes in distribution procedures or 
costs of special promotional 
packaging)
a,c
 
UK Competition Commission, 2008; Dobson, 
2005; Duffy et al., 2003  
15. Requirement for suppliers’ 
contribution to various retailers’ costs 
(e.g. market research)
a,c
 
UK Competition Commission, 2008; Dobson, 
2005 
16. Requirement for reduced financial 
payments
a,c
 
European Commission, 2013; UK Competition 
Commission, 2008; Dobson, 2005; Fearne et al., 
2004 
17. Requirement for a contribution by 
suppliers for financial losses occurred 
by retailers after received products 
(e.g. in-store thefts or retailers’ 
accounting errors)
a,c
 
Comisión Nacional de la Competencia, 2011; UK 
Competition Commission, 2008 
18. Failure to compensate suppliers for 
costs and profit losses caused by 
retailers’ actions (e.g. retailers’ 
forecasting errors)
a,c
 
European Commission, 2013; UK Competition 
Commission, 2008; Towill, 2005 
19. Ad-hoc unilateral change to an 
agreement concerning product order 
quantity or product quality without 
compensating suppliers
a,b
 
European Commission, 2013; Comisión Nacional 
de la Competencia, 2011; UK Competition 
Commission, 2008; Dobson, 2005; Carter, 2000 
20. Ad-hoc unilateral change to an 
agreement concerning the number of 
stores where a product will be 
stocked without compensating the 
supplier
a,b
 
European Commission, 2013; Comisión Nacional 
de la Competencia, 2011; UK Competition 
Commission, 2008; Dobson, 2005 
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21. Ad-hoc unilateral change to an 
agreement concerning the number of 
in-store promotional activities that 
will take place without compensating 
the supplier
a,b
 
European Commission, 2013; Comisión Nacional 
de la Competencia, 2011; UK Competition 
Commission, 2008; Dobson, 2005; Duffy et al., 
2003; Murry & Heide, 1998 
22. Ad-hoc unilateral change to an 
agreement concerning the number of 
products/ product codes that will be 
stocked without compensating the 
supplier
a,b
 
European Commission, 2013; Comisión Nacional 
de la Competencia, 2011; UK Competition 
Commission, 2008; Dobson, 2005; Fearne et al., 
2005 
23. Buy back unsold products outside the 
agreement
a,c
 
European Commission, 2013; Comisión Nacional 
de la Competencia, 2011; UK Competition 
Commission, 2008; Dobson, 2005; Moberg & 
Speh, 2003 
24. Obscure terms of agreementa,b 
European Commission, 2013; Comisión Nacional 
de la Competencia, 2011; Carter, 2000 
25. Payment delay without a good 
cause
a,b
 
European Commission, 2013; Comisión Nacional 
de la Competencia, 2011; UK Competition 
Commission, 2008 
26. Discrimination between suppliers 
concerning credit periods
a,b
 
UK Competition Commission, 2008; Dobson, 
2005; Carter, 2000 
27. New and retrospective agreement for 
extra financial support in order to 
achieve annual economic objectives
b
 
Practice identified in qualitative phase 
28. Terminating the relationship or some 
aspects of it without prior notice or 
further explanation
a,b
 
European Commission, 2013; Duffy et al., 2003 
29. Limited time for stocking new 
products in order to achieve high 
turnover
b
 
Practice identified in qualitative phase 
30. Promotional price given by a supplier 
does not appear in final price
a,c
 
UK Competition Commission, 2008; Kumar et al., 
2001; Murry & Heide, 1998 
31. Forward buying of productsa,c 
UK Competition Commission, 2008; Dobson, 
2005; Towill, 2005; Fearne et al., 2004 
32. Requirement for reduced prices for 
special promotions but the volumes 
ordered by retailers are reduced
a,c
 
UK Competition Commission, 2008; Dobson, 
2005; Moberg & Speh, 2003 
33. Requirement for purchasing goods or 
services from designated companies
a,c
 
Comisión Nacional de la Competencia, 2011; UK 
Competition Commission, 2008; Dobson, 2005; 
Duffy et al., 2003 
34. Requirement for an exclusive supply 
of a product
a,c
 
Comisión Nacional de la Competencia, 2011; UK 
Competition Commission, 2008; Dobson, 2005; 
Burt & Sparks, 2003 
35. Forcing supplier’s prices down or 
refusing supplier’s justified price 
increases which occurred due to an 
increase in suppliers’ costs (e.g. 
increase in raw material prices)
a,b
 
Fearne et al., 2005; Duffy et al., 2003 
36. Refuse to stock a product with a Practice identified in qualitative phase 
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lower profit margin from supplier 
with high amount of sales with the 
excuse of getting a higher average 
profit margin from other suppliers 
from that product category
b
 
37. Falsely suggesting that competitive 
supplier is offering better trade 
terms
a,b
 
Carter, 2000 
38. Threaten to delist a supplier in order 
to improve terms and decrease 
supplier’s pricea,b 
European Commission, 2013; Comisión Nacional 
de la Competencia, 2011; UK Competition 
Commission, 2008; Fearne et al., 2005 
39. Exaggeration of seriousness of 
problems (e.g. low demand for a 
product) to gain extra concessions
a,b
 
Carter, 2000 
40. Optimistic sales forecasts to gain 
extra concessions from suppliers
a,b
 
Fearne et al., 2004; Carter, 2000 
a 
Practice identified in the literature 
b Practice confirmed as significant in the qualitative phase and included in the survey’s 
questionnaire 
c 
Practice rejected in the qualitative phase 
d 
Reverse coded item 
Note 
Practices included in the survey’s questionnaire are highlighted in Italics 
 
 
Table B: Profile of respondents and their firms 
Firm demographics 
Annual 
turnover (%) 
≤ 2 m € > 2 m € & ≤ 10 m € > 10 m € & ≤ 50 m € > 50 m € 
29% 38% 23% 10% 
Number of 
employees 
(%) 
< 10 > 10 & ≤ 50 > 50 & ≤ 250 > 250 
13% 50% 27% 10% 
Average 
length of 
relationship 
with retailers 
(%) 
1-5 years 6-10 years 11-20 years > 20 years 
13% 25% 39% 23% 
Demographics for respondents 
Sex (%) 
Male Female 
65% 35% 
Age (%) 
≤ 30 31-40 41-50 > 50 
16% 34% 29% 21% 
Position in 
the firm 
General 
Manager 
Owner 
Sales 
Manager 
Trade 
Manager 
Other 
3% 6% 43% 19% 29% 
Number of years working in the firm (Mean) 13.1 
Number of years working in the sector (Mean) 15.7 
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Table C: Survey’s interview schedule 
The interview will be focused on your firm’s relationships with retailers and will focus on 
your firm’s branded packaged products. During the interview you should think about one 
typical relationship of your firm with a retailer. Do not think about your firm’s best or 
worse relationship but think about a typical relationship with a retailer. 
Please indicate the key product which your firm sell to the top five retailers of the Greek 
market: ……………………………………………………………… 
A) Characteristics of the relationship  
Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements 
concerning your firm’s relationships with the leading five retailers. Please rate your 
answer in a scale between “1: Totally disagree” to “7: Totally agree”. 
 Totally 
disagree 
     Totally 
agree 
It would be costly to lose these customers. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We are dependent on these customers. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
If we lose this customer, it will be very difficult to 
maintain our current total level of sales. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We cannot afford to lose this customer. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our company and retailers we work with have different 
financial goals. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Retailers do not support our financial goals. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Meeting our firm’s financial goals clashes with meeting 
retailers’ financial goals. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Retailers avoid sharing important information regarding 
our product category, competitors or market in general. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Retailers usually do not share information or do only if we 
ask them to or in case of information exchange agreement.
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Retailers usually do not share information about events or 
changes that may affect our company. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Retailers won’t volunteer to provide helpful information to 
us unless we ask them to. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
There would be significant costs associated with 
monitoring in detail whether retailers are performing all of 
their contractual obligations under our agreement. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our commercial agreements with retailers refer to many 
stores, promotional activities, products and commercial 
activities and it is difficult to verify if they are performing 
all their contractual obligations under these agreement. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
It is easy to monitor whether retailers are performing all of 
their contractual obligations under our agreement.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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B) Multiple retailers’ practices 
Please indicate to what extent the above practices occurred or are still occurring during 
your firm’s relationship with multiple retailers. Please rate your answer in a scale between 
“1: Never” to “7: In a high degree”. 
 
Never 
     A high 
degree 
Extra payments as a condition for stocking products 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Extra payments for better in-store positioning of products 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Extra payments for new store openings 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Extra payments as a condition for stocking products or a 
better in-store positioning of products or new store openings 
or a supplier being included in a retailer’s brochure offer. 
These are upfront lump sum payments instead of paying a 
sum equivalent to a percentage of product turnover 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ad-hoc unilateral change to an agreement concerning the 
number of products/ product codes that will be stocked 
without compensating the supplier 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ad-hoc unilateral change to an agreement concerning the 
number of stores where a product will be stocked without 
compensating the supplier 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ad-hoc unilateral change to an agreement concerning the 
number of in-store promotional activities that will take place 
without compensating the supplier 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Obscure terms of agreement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Forcing supplier’s prices down or refusing supplier’s 
justified price increases which occurred due to an increase in 
suppliers’ costs (e.g. increase in raw material prices) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Falsely suggesting that competitive supplier is offering better 
trade terms 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Exaggeration of seriousness of problems (e.g. low demand 
for a product) in order to gain extra concessions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Refuse to stock a product with a lower profit margin from a 
supplier with high amount of sales with the excuse of getting 
a higher average profit margin from other suppliers from that 
product category 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Favoring own brands against branded (suppliers’) products 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Payment delay without a good cause
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
New and retrospective agreement for extra financial support 
in order to achieve annual economic objectives 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Retailers do not contribute financially to promotional 
activities (e.g. buy one get one free promotion) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Threaten to delist a supplier in order to improve terms and 
decrease supplier’s price 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Financial support for matching competing retailer’s lower 
price 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Discrimination between suppliers concerning credit periods 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Optimistic sales forecasts to gain concessions from suppliers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Limited time for stocking new products in order to achieve 
high turnover 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No extra payment is required by a supplier for being 
included in a retailer’s brochure offer (R) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Terminating the relationship or some aspects of it without 
prior notice or further explanation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ad-hoc unilateral change to an agreement concerning 
product order quantity or product quality without 
compensating suppliers 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
C) Demographics 
C1) Firm’s demographics 
Please indicate:  
The number or employees working in your firm … 
Your firm’s annual turnover … 
The average number of years that your firm is supplying multiple 
retailers … 
C2) Respondent’s demographics 
Please indicate:  
Your age … 
Your sex 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Your current position in the company … 
The numbers of years you are working in the sector … 
The number of years you are working in the company … 
 
 
Table D: Descriptive analysis 
Construct Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis  
Dependence
a 
5.00  1.49 -0.82 0.06 
Goal incompatibility
a 
4.40  1.36 -0.17 -0.22 
Informational asymmetry
a 
4.86  1.27 -0.40 -0.12 
Behavioral uncertainty
a 
3.84 1.45 0.03 -0.62 
Unanticipated changes in 
agreements
b 3.83 
1.52 
-0.02 -0.87 
Upfront payments
b 
4.38 1.50 -0.43 -0.64 
Negotiation pressures
b 
4.83 1.33 -0.69 0.37 
Overall mean of the commercial 
practices
b,c 4.42 1.12 -0.24 -0.48 
a
Based on a seven-point Likert-type scale (1=“totally disagree” to 7=“totally agree”) 
b
Based on a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = “never” to 7= “in a high degree”) 
c
Range of values: 3.54-5.15 
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VIGNETTE: Two dyadic cases for the supplier-retailer relationship 
The two cases below will focus on the relationship between two major retailers and 
their suppliers. They will also illustrate the use of commercial practices in the Greek 
market allowing retailers to obtain higher gains. These two retailers were examined in 
our survey and further insights were provided during the qualitative study. Retailer A 
generates €1.8 billion turnover whilst Retailer B generates €1.2 billion turnover 
(ICAP, 2013). Retailer A has stores throughout the country while Retailer B has 
expanded with stores in the Greek capital, Athens. Retailer A is very demanding with 
suppliers while Retailer B seems to be more understanding and supportive of 
suppliers’ needs. 
Retailer A 
A trade manager employed by a multinational supplier commented on his dealings 
with Retailer A:  
“The power is in the hands of retailers. Unless your firm is a large and / or a 
multinational one, the retailers will dominate the relationship. They will put pressures 
on suppliers to increase their gains; this is how the market works. The stronger 
retailers get more gains. They use many ways to obtain higher gains and every year 
they come up with new ideas (i.e. new commercial practices) to increase their 
benefits. These practices are part of my bargaining with retailers. Retailer A is the 
toughest negotiator. It always requires more from suppliers, it always complains that 
consumers don’t have money and that my competitors offer them more allowances. It 
is not easy to say no to that retailer especially if you work for a small firm. It depends 
on the relative power of the supplier. In my case, Retailer A represents 30% of my 
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turnover in the Greek market. I can not afford to lose that customer and it would be 
impossible to replace any sales lost. Hence, I tolerate significant payment delays from 
Retailer A which is a common practice. This results in extra financial pressure as the 
liquidity of my firm has decreased significantly. In some cases, I feel that Retailer A 
does not care about my business plan and it only cares about its short term gains. For 
example, Retailer A required significant upfront payments for a new product in order 
to be available in its stores. As a supplier I would prefer that retailer to pay me based 
on the sales performance of my products. Overall, suppliers need to be fully aware of 
their cost structures in order to be able to accommodate the increasing demands posed 
by retailers during the contract negotiations. Retailer A also uses vague terms during 
contract negotiations. For example, that retailer may promise to run 3-5 promotional 
activities for my products throughout the year but it will demand from me trade 
concessions for exactly five activities. However, it is highly likely that my products 
will be on promotion only 3 times whilst other products (including competitors!) will 
be promoted during the other 2. It is difficult for me to prove this. If you are a weak 
supplier then there are not many things you could do. I am aware that Retailer A had a 
highly profitable agreement with a small egg supplier where the gains were unequally 
distributed between the retailer and the supplier (in retailers’ favor). Retailer A could 
not meet its annual trade targets and changed the trade agreement by adding an extra 
month for paying back that supplier. This created a serious cash flow problem for that 
supplier. No formal meeting was arranged and the egg supplier received a phone call 
where it was stated that unless the new terms were agreed, none of its product 
deliveries will be processed by the warehouses. This is a prime example of the high 
pressures suppliers face”.  
 
 
56 
 
Retailer B 
A trade manager employed by a national supplier commented on his dealings with 
Retailer B.  
“All retailers try to increase their gains and this is largely expected. Retailers put 
pressure on suppliers, they are very creative and they find ways to improve their 
gains. But this also helps me as a supplier to be more innovative and to come up with 
new ideas. I always enjoy doing business with Retailer B. What makes that retailer 
distinctive in the market is the fact that it understands its suppliers’ needs. Retailer B 
knows how to increase its gains but without putting too much pressure on suppliers. 
For example, this retailer pays suppliers promptly and this is one of the key reasons 
for suppliers supporting that retailer as much as they can. Hence, I offer various 
promotional activities to Retailer B whilst I am not offering any of those activities to 
other retailers. For example, I offer many “buy one get one free” promotions to 
Retailer B since it is the only retailer willing to contribute to the cost of such activity. 
In addition, I know that this retailer will handle my products well and there would be 
no extra financial payments from that retailer in case there is poor stock turnover for 
my products in its stores; however, other retailers will act differently and may demand 
extra payments. Therefore, Retailer B has the best reputation in the market for dealing 
with suppliers including the weaker suppliers too. Hence, all suppliers want to deal 
with Retailer B but Retailer B will not engage with a supplier unless its products will 
match the retailer’s image and value proposition”.  
